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Abstract
We analyze the conditions of emergence of a twin banking and sovereign debt
crisis within a monetary union in which: (i) the central bank is not allowed to
provide direct nancial support to stressed member states or to play the role of
lender of last resort in sovereign bond markets, and (ii) the responsibility of ghting
against large scale bank runs, ascribed to domestic governments, is ensured through
the implementation of a nancial safety net (banking regulation and government de-
posit guarantee). We show that this broad institutional architecture, typical of the
Eurozone at the onset of the nancial crisis, is not always able to prevent the occur-
rence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis triggered by pessimistic investors
expectations. Without signicant backstop by the central bank, the nancial safety
net may actually aggravate, instead of improve, the nancial situation of banks and
of the government.
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1 Introduction
One remarkable unexpected consequence of the 2007-2009 nancial crisis is that several
countries in the Europeriphery (such as Ireland or Spain) whose governments had been
prudent in the management of public nance before the crisis, are since then confronting
a new kind of twin crisis a¤ecting simultaneously the banking system and the market
for sovereign debt.1 As described by Lane (2012), before the crisis, the creation of the
euro and the elimination of the currency risk allowed banks in europeriphery countries to
substantially increase international short-term funding at signicantly lower real interest
rates, enabling them to sustain a strong domestic economic growth. Yet, the global n-
ancial crisis triggered a massive international reallocation of resources in a movement
of ight to quality. Countries which relied the most on international funding were dis-
proportionately more a¤ected by this drying up of liquidity, and their banking system
was put under extraordinary stress. As a result, Ireland, Portugal and Spain had to
implement massive bailout programs to save their domestic banks. This, combined with
the signicant reductions in tax revenues incurred by the sharp economic contraction,
led to strong increases in public debt-to-GDP ratios in these countries.
In October 2009, following the announcement by newly elected government in Greece
of much larger decits than previously reported, increasing concerns about the ability
of europeriphery countries to honor their debt quickly emerged, leading to a dramatic
increase in the yields on their government bonds (perhaps aggravated by excessive rating
downgrades by credit rating agencies). This generated two main e¤ects which contrib-
uted to the emergence of the twin-crisis: rst, the cost of public debt in these countries
was dramatically increased by a surge in risk premia, aggravating the debt sustainab-
ility concern. Second, the increased risk of sovereign defaults signicantly deteriorated
the balance sheet of domestic banks (which were often the main buyers of domestic
debt), but also of many major banks in the core Eurozone which were holding signic-
ant amount of euro-country government bonds for regulatory purposes. The Eurozone
found itself stuck in a situation where a potential collapse of the economy of several of
its member states would spread over the entire area, while the status of the European
Central Bank prevented it (or, at least, in the wake of the crisis, were supposed to pre-
vent it) to provide direct nancial support to private banks or to stabilize sovereign
debt markets by playing, either explicitly or implicitly, the role of lender of last resort
in the government bond market.2 Fears of contagion of the crisis from periphery to
1The government debt/GDP ratio in 2008 was 36% for Spain, 25% for Ireland, and 68% for Portugal.
In the rst quarter of 2012, these ratios climbed to 72%, 108% and 112%, respectively.
2Several "unconventional" monetary policy measures, such as Longer Term Renancing Operations
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core-euro countries, and the resulting endangering of the entire monetary union, became
the predominant concern of policy-makers in the Eurozone and worldwide. As a result,
the European Union and the IMF settled large joint bailout programs for Greece, Ire-
land, Portugal and Spain. Shortly after, in August 2012, the ECB implicitly changed its
doctrine by announcing that it would purchase upon request and subject to condition-
ality unlimited amounts of government bonds of a distressed member state (the OMT
program).3 This announcement was followed by a signicant and persistent drop in the
interest rates on sovereign bonds of stressed countries, helping to stabilize the Eurozone
(EZ) and removing immediate threats of a potential Euro breakup.
There is by now a substantial academic literature that documents the course of these
events and their main determinants. De Grauwe (2011), Lane (2012) and Shambaugh
(2012) are prominent examples. These papers clearly ascribe a dominant role to the
mutually reinforcing interactions between the banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis
 what Brunnermeier et al. (2011) have dubbed the "diabolical loop"  and emphasize
the potential contagion e¤ects of the crisis from the Europeriphery to the whole monetary
union. They also analyze how these harmful interactions have been favored by the weak
institutional design of the Eurozone.
Yet, from a theoretical point of view, very few models in the literature allow to ex-
plain how a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis may emerge within a monetary union
with an institutional architecture broadly similar to that of the Eurozone when it entered
the nancial crisis. The aim of this paper is to make a contribution in this direction.
We provide a theoretical framework enabling us to analyze the conditions of emergence
of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis within a monetary union characterized by
the following distinctive features: (i) member state economies are strongly interrelated,
in the sense that domestics banks in each country hold a signicant amount of foreign
debt of other member state countries, (ii) government bonds issued by member states
are denominated in local currency, (iii) the central bank is not allowed to provide direct
nancial support to distressed member states, to "monetize" debt, or to play the role of
lender of last resort in government bond markets, and (iv) (partly as a consequence of
(iii)) the burden of rescuing the banking system if a large scale bank run materializes
is entirely left to domestic governments (there is no banking union or similar insurance
(LTROs) with a maturity of up to 36 months, had actually been undertaken by the ECB between 2008
and 2012. Yet, the fact that these measures were limited in amounts implied that they were not successful
to stabilize sovereign rate spreads durably.
3The fact that the ECB implicitly changed its doctrine by announcing the OMT program has been
widely recognized by commentators, and is actually the main reason for the legal dispute between the
Bundesbank and the ECB  the Bundesbank arguing that the ECB overstepped its legal limits by
committing to such a program.
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mechanisms at the supranational level). In this latter respect, member states of the mon-
etary union have implemented a nancial safety net (banking regulation and government
deposit guarantee). We argue that these characteristics, which signicantly di¤er from
those of emerging countries to which the traditional literature on banking crises and/or
on sovereign default has applied, describe fairly well the institutional context of the EZ
at the onset of the crisis, i.e. before the ECB changed its doctrine by announcing the
OMT program.
We investigate these issues by introducing government and public debt concerns
in a small open-economy banking crisis model inspired by Chang and Velasco (2001).
In this setup, the role of domestic banks is to pool resources collected from domestic
residents and external investors and to invest them e¢ ciently into short-term and long-
term (illiquid) investment projects. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the maturity
mismatch between assets and liabilities is usually associated with the existence of two
equilibria in the laissez-faire economy: a "good" equilibrium in which agents do not run
and which decentralizes the second-best resources allocation and a "bad" equilibrium in
which agents run and force banks to liquidate long-run investment projects before going
bankrupt. As in Chang and Velasco (2001), the potentiality of a major collapse of the
banking system is reinforced when a "sudden-stop" of short term capital inows occurs.
In order to prevent the realization of such large scale bank runs, member states of
the monetary union have implemented a nancial safety net based on two pillars: rst,
there is a liquidity regulation, imposed at the supranational level, that forces banks to
hold a fraction of their assets in the form of high-grade government bonds. Second, each
government provides a deposit guarantee, implemented at the country level, associated
with a commitment to raise any possible additional resources on nancial markets in
order to bail out banks with insu¢ cient liquidity (and thus to cover the withdrawal
requests of depositors). We show that, in the model, a greater intensity of liquidity
regulation imposed ex ante reduces the nancial burden of the bailout package ex post
(if a large scale bank run were to materialize). Yet, it also decreases consumption and
welfare in normal times, so that there is a trade-o¤ involved.
We analyze the conditions under which the existence of this nancial safety net is
su¢ cient, or not, to prevent the occurrence of a nationwide bank run following a negative
shock on economic fundamentals. It is at this stage, we argue, that the legal framework
delimiting the role and functions of the central bank is of crucial importance. In par-
ticular, we show that if the central bank is not empowered to play the role of lender of
last resort in government bond markets (and is not allowed to provide direct nancial
support to countries facing a major threat to their banking system), there are circum-
4
stances in which the nancial safety net aggravates, instead of improves, the nancial
situation of domestic banks and of the government.4 When this is the case, a mere
banking crisis threat may translate into a fully edged twin banking and sovereign debt
crisis. We show that such a crisis, partly triggered by self-fullling changes in investors
expectations, may occur even for countries with "decent" economic fundamentals.
The main economic mechanisms underlying this result can be described as follows.
If, in the face of the governments commitment to rescue failing banks, investors remain
condent about the sustainability of the public debt, they do not require a large risk
premium on newly-issued government bonds and the bailout package is credible: its
mere existence, combined with the liquidity regulation described above, is su¢ cient to
eliminate the run equilibrium. If, by contrast, the commitment to bail out banks raises
strong concerns about the creditworthiness of the government, the resulting increase
in the risk premium on sovereign bonds generates two negative e¤ects on the banking
system and on public nance: rst, it decreases the price of government bonds in the
secondary market, thus reducing the liquidity bu¤er that banks can obtain by selling their
government bond holdings and aggravating their liquidity shortfall. Second, it increases
the cost of the bailout package for the government, since a larger nancial backstop
must be nanced through bond issuance at worst market conditions. When the surge
in the risk premium on government bonds is such that the level of public debt if the
bailout package was implemented is considered unsustainable, the government deposit
guarantee becomes non-credible, and the lack of condence of external investors triggers
a self-fullling twin banking and sovereign debt crisis. We establish the coexistence
of these two situations as equilibrium congurations in countries with soft (not overly
weak or strong) economic fundamentals. Moreover, we show that countries with a larger
reliance on external short-term funding are more exposed to a twin crisis equilibrium.
In the nal section of the paper, we illustrate how our framework can be adapted to
analyze several related policy issues that have emerged during the EZ crisis. In particu-
lar, we assess the proposition that Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have played a role in
triggering the crisis by downgrading countries by more than would have been justied
by economic fundamentals. We show that while CRAs do not have any inuence on the
existence of a twin crisis equilibrium conguration, CRA ratings may favor the emer-
gence of a twin crisis in the limited sense of playing the role of an exogenous coordination
device. Moreover, such self-fullling rating downgrades would appear ex post as entirely
4Our result in this regard can be viewed as a direct application of the analysis by Allen and Gale
(2007), who show that poorly designed and implemented banking regulation can lead to an increase in
systemic risk.
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justied by economic fundamentals. We also analyze the issue of contagion from stressed
countries to other member states of the monetary union through the banking system,
and we discuss proposed policy options to avoid the resurgence of such crises such as the
creation of "Eurobonds".
To sum up, the contributions of our paper are twofold. First, our paper aims to
provide a framework suitable for the analysis of the main determinants of the EZ crisis
and its consequences. Being cast into the specic institutional design of the EZ (see
above), this framework di¤ers in several respects from those of "emerging economies" to
which the traditional literature on banking crisis and/or sovereign default has applied
(see the discussion of related literature in section 2 below). Second, using this framework,
we highlight several features that, in our view, had a signicant role in the emergence
of the EZ crisis. Beyond the traditional inuence of key macroeconomic variables (such
as the initial debt-to-GDP ratio, the degree of reliance on external debt, the re sale
price of depreciated assets, etc.), we emphasize the importance of investorssentiments
as an important catalyst to the crisis, and we explain why the nancial safety net has
not fullled its role of containing the nancial crisis in the face of negative investors
expectations. More generally, we analyze why the poor institutional design of the EZ
did not help to stabilize the crisis. Finally, the discussion of various additional issues
relevant to the EZ crisis provided in the end of the paper illustrates the exibility of our
framework and its ability to accommodate extensions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey discusses
the related literature. In section 3, we present the benchmark model. In section 4, we
analyze the functioning of the nancial safety net and explore the conditions under which
it eliminates the run equilibrium under normal nancial market conditions. In section 5,
we show how these results can be overturned under stressed nancial conditions. Section
6 shows how our model can be used to discuss recent policy issues associated with the
EZ crisis, and section 7 concludes. Analytical calculations used to derive our main
propositions and results are explicitly provided in an accompanying technical appendix.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to a number of contributions in the literature. Most obviously, it
brings together elements from the literature on banking crisis and from the literature
on sovereign default in a unied framework. Regarding the banking crisis literature,
the structure of our benchmark model is based on Chang and Velasco (2001), which
transposes the seminal banking crisis model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) into the
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context of a small open economy with heavy reliance on short term external funding
(see also Diamond and Rajan, 2001). We introduce in the Chang and Velasco setup
various additional features, such as the existence of a nancial safety net (liquidity
regulation and government deposit guarantee) and the presence of a government with
public debt issues, to analyze the conditions of emergence of a twin crisis in a context
more closely related to that of the Eurozone. Concerning the sovereign default literature,
our model borrows from Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) the notion that the ability of a
country to rely on external funding is limited by a ceiling on its public debt. Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) show that such a feature emerges endogenously in a context of
potential debt repudiation.5 Other particularly relevant references include the "self-
fullling debt crisis" literature pioneered by Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000).
Calvo (1988) shows that when the government has the possibility to renege on its debt,
government bond issuance can generate multiple perfect-foresight equilibria, with or
without government default. Cole and Kehoe (2000) demonstrate the possibility of self-
fullling sovereign debt crises triggered by a lack of condence of international investors
who refuse to roll over government debt.
More recent papers related to our research also analyze the conditions of emergence of
a sovereign debt crisis in the EZ context. In particular, Bolton and Jeanne (2011) analyze
the contagious e¤ects of the sovereign debt crisis through the banking system (see also
Arellano and Bai, 2013). Gennaioli et al. (2012) emphasize the interactions between a
governments incentive to default and the fragility of its banking system. Acharya et al.
(2011) study the interactions between the banking and the sovereign debt crises implied
by government bailouts (and the associated increase in the risk premium on sovereign
bonds). Many determinants emphasized in these papers are also key ingredients in our
analysis. Yet, the analyses in these papers are entirely based on economic fundamentals,
while we emphasize, beyond fundamentals, the possibility that the emergence of a twin
banking and sovereign debt crisis be triggered by self-fullling changes in investors
expectations.6 As such, our analysis provides direct support to the empirical ndings
5The "sovereign default" literature that followed the seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz is too
vast to be surveyed here (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012)
for important recent contributions). Note that our framework di¤ers from that literature in that we treat
the possibility of a government default more as a constraint on government intervention rather than as
a strategic decision weighing the costs and benets of default compared to other policy options. In our
view, this last assumption is particularly relevant to describe the situation of europeriphery countries,
whose unwillingness to default on their public debt has been illustrated by the (repeated) commitment
to undertake drastic austerity measures, despite the huge economic and political costs associated to such
measures.
6Our aim is obviously not to claim that economic fundamentals did not play a signicant role in the
trigger of a twin crisis in europeriphery countries. As mentioned above, our paper actually underlines the
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by De Grauwe and Ji (2013) that europeriphery countries with initially small debt-to-
GDP ratio were more exposed to a sovereign debt crisis than standalone countries with
monetary sovereignty (and much higher initial levels of public debt ratios). Related
contributions on this issue include Corsetti and Dedola (2013) and Aguiar et al. (2013).
Both papers explore the extent to which a central bank can eliminate "Calvo-style"
self-fullling sovereign debt crises by intervening in the sovereign bond market (Corsetti
and Dedola, 2013) or by creating ination (Aguiar et al., 2013). As such, these papers
more adequately describe the situation of the Eurozone after the change in ECB doctrine
discussed above, while we focus on the earlier stages of the EZ crisis.
3 A small economy model with a banking system
3.1 The environment
We consider a small open-economy populated by a large number of ex ante identical
domestic residents of mass 1. Each period is divided into three stages indexed by t =
0; 1; 2; dened as the planning stage, the intermediate stage (short-term) and the nal
stage (long-term), respectively. To produce the unique good of the economy, which is
freely traded in the world market and can be consumed and invested, domestic (and only
domestic) residents have access to a short-term and a long-term constant-return-to-scale
production technology. The long-term technology is illiquid and is highly productive,
with a yield Rh > 1 if the investment is held until stage 2, but early liquidation in
t = 1 will cause its yields to diminish to Rl < 1 per unit invested. The short-term
technology yields, in the intermediate stage t = 1; Rs units of good per unit invested,
with 1 < Rs < Rh. There is also a world capital market in which each unit invested at
t = 0 yields a unit return in t = 1; and a return R = 1+ r in t = 2, where r > 0 is the
world interest rate.7 As in Chang and Velasco (2001), we assume that domestic agents
can invest as much as they want in this international market, but can borrow a maximum
of f > 0 units of good per period.8 Finally, the government taxes entrepreneursprojects
at a rate  per unit produced in order to nance public expenditures. We assume that
importance of crucial economic variables for the existence of a twin crisis equilibrium. Yet, depending on
the situation, investors may underreact or overreact to exogenous changes in the economic environment.
Our paper shows that an abrupt change in investorsexpectations can drive a country with "moderately
strong" economic fundamentals into a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis, even though such a crisis
would not occur under more positive expectations.
7The assumption of a unit return between stages 0 and 1 is a simplifying assumption imposed without
loss of generality.
8As discussed below when we introduce public debt, the existence of such a ceiling can be justied
by many theories of international borrowing under credit market imperfections.
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 is su¢ ciently small that after-tax returns satisfy:
(1  )Rl < 1 < R < (1  )Rs < (1  )Rh; (1)
As explained below, because agents at the planning stage do not know whether they
will be "patient" or "impatient" (and thus whether they will prefer to consume at stage
1 or stage 2), the best option for them, rather than investing directly into the available
production technologies, is to pool their resources and form a coalition. The obtained
coalition, which is called a "commercial bank" for obvious reasons, can then use the law
of large numbers to get rid of individual uncertainty and invest e¢ ciently into the two
types of investment projects.
In the following, we give a detailed description of the behaviors and constraints of
domestic residents, commercial banks and the government.
Domestic residents Domestic residents are of two types: impatient (type 1) or patient
(type 2). An impatient agent derives utility only from consuming at the intermediate
stage, t = 1; while a patient agent derives utility from consuming at the nal stage t = 2:
Each domestic resident is endowed with an amount e > 0 of a tradable good in period 0.
Yet, information about agent types is private and is revealed only at t = 1. Thus, during
the planning stage t = 0; domestic residents are uncertain about their type. They do
know, however, the probability  of being impatient, which is identical for all agents.
Denoting by x the amount of good consumed at t = 1 and by y the amount of good
consumed at t = 2, the expected utility of the representative domestic resident at t = 0
is:
U(x) + (1  )U(y):
where U() is a CRRA instantaneous utility function dened by U(c) = c1 =(1 ) for
 6= 1; and by U(c) = lnC for  = 1; where  > 0 is a positive relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient.
The government The government starts the period with an amount of debt D0 in-
herited from the past period. This debt is rolled over by issuing at t = 0 a quantity B02
of long-term (zero-coupon) government bond maturing at the end of stage 2. Each
unit of bond promises to pay 1 unit of good in stage 2. The discount rate on these bonds
is denoted by rd02; so that the issue price of each unit of bonds is 1=(1 + r
d
02): Thus,
D0 = B02=(1 + r
d
02):
During stages 1 and 2, the government collects taxes T raised on short-term, long
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term and restructured projects, and spends an exogenous amount G of government
expenditures: It can also issue an additional amount B12 of "short-term" government
bonds in the intermediate stage (t = 1) if it needs extra liquidity. These bonds also
mature at the end of stage 2, but the discount rate rd12 applied on them depends on
stage 1 market conditions.
The government budget constraint is thus:
D2 = B02 +B12 +G  T
= D0(1 + r
d
02) +B12 +G  T
The debt level D2 left at the end of stage 2 will be the initial debt level at the
beginning of the next period and, again, this debt will have to be rolled over by issuing
new long-term government bonds in international nancial markets. However, as in the
case of domestic resident, we assume that there exists a ceiling gf for the ratio of public
debt over potential GDP, eY ; above which international investors refuse to renance the
debt.9
Thus, renancing will be done provided that the ratio of debt over potential GDP
does not exceed the exogenous ceiling gf ; i.e. the constraint
D2eY  gf
is satised.10 Otherwise, the government is considered insolvent.
Commercial banks As intermediaries between depositors and rms, banks take ad-
vantage of the law of large numbers to predict more accurately future needs for (costly)
9The assumption that such a ceiling indeed characterizes the situation of europeriphery countries is
worth discussing. As is well known, a limit on the ability of a government to borrow in international
nancial markets arises endogenously in economies with potential debt repudiation when there is no
possible backstop from the monetary authority (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). In the case of emerging
countries, this is a natural assumption since government debt is usually denominated in foreign currency.
In the Eurozone, however, a di¤erent logic applies since government bonds are typically denominated in
euros. In this case, it is mostly the institutional design of the Eurozone (before September 2012) that
actually made the situation of member states "as if" they were borrowing in a foreign currency, since
the lack of monetary sovereignty at the country level and the inability of the ECB to play a role of
lender of last resort in government bond markets implied that each member state could actually default.
This is particularly true when the borrowing cost of governments sharply increases due to a surge in
risk premia, as was typically the case in europeriphery countries in the aftermath of the nancial crisis.
For more discussions of these issues and of the "scal limits" imposed on governments with or without
central bank intervention, see Leeper (2013).
10The formal expression for potential GDP eY , dened as the level of GDP in "normal times", i.e.
when there is no banking crisis threat, is derived below.
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liquidity. Banks thus collect agent deposits (equal to e at equilibrium) and use their
capacity to borrow in the international nancial market (up to f > 0 in each stage 0
and 1) to invest K and A units of good in the long-term and the short-term productive
technologies, respectively. The deposit contract stipulates that depositors are allowed
to withdraw, at their discretion, either x units of consumption in period 1 or y units of
consumption in period 2. An agent of type 2 who withdraws x units of consumption in
period 1 can invest them in the international market and consume Rx in period 2. The
incentive compatibility constraint, implying that an agent of type 2 has no interest to
misrepresent his type, then requires Rx < y:
Banks investment decisions are also restricted by two kinds of constraints. First,
banks must obviously ensure that they have enough liquidity to meet the withdrawal
requests of impatient agents, x; at t = 1 under any circumstances. Second, as explained
below, in order to limit the possibility of occurrence of a large-scale bank run, banks must
comply with a nancial regulation which imposes them to hold a minimum percentage
 2 (0; ) of their debt principal in the form of safe and liquid assets, the latter being
uniquely composed of AAA-rated government bonds issued by member states of the
monetary union.11 The upper bound  on the intensity of regulation will be endogenously
derived below. Banks are required to hold such bonds (purchased at t = 0) until t = 2
unless a bank run occurs in the intermediary stage, in which case they can get extra-
liquidity by selling them in the secondary market.12
11As is well known, holding (supposedly safe and liquid) high-grade government bonds was a convenient
way to comply with the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in Basel II accords, since for a given amount
of core capital, the CAR enabled to assign 0% risk weighting to AAA-rated government bonds (thereby
reducing the value of total assets in the calculation of the ratio). This form of liquidity regulation has
actually been reinforced by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio implemented in Basel III accords, whose aim
is "to promote the short term resilience of the liquidity risk prole of banks [... ] by ensuring that banks
have an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily
and immediately in private markets into cash to meet their liquidity needs" during stressed episodes
(Bank for International Settlements, 2013).
12Banking regulation was not of course the only reason why EZ banks held peripheral government
bonds. As emphasized by Bolton and Jeanne (2011), another reason is that high-grade government
bonds can be used as collateral for interbank loans or for lending from the central bank. Likewise, as
stressed by Acharya and Ste¤en (2013), EZ banks also actively embraced a "carry trade" behavior, using
funds collected on short-term wholesale markets to buy peripheral sovereign bonds and attempting to
benet from di¤erences between the costs and returns of these investments. While we do not model
explicitly this behavior, its ex-post impact on the fragility of the banking system is similar to the one
we emphasize in the remaining of the paper, since what matters for the result is that banks hold a
signicant share of their assets in the form of peripheral and core EZ government bonds. For others
analyses emphasizing the role of government bonds as a source of liquidity and the links between the
sovereign and liquidity crises, see for instance Brutti (2011) and Gennaioli et al. (2012). The seminal
analysis of government bonds as a source of liquidity for rms and banks is Holmström and Tirole (1998).
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The constraints faced by the representative commercial bank are thus the following:
A+K +
Bd02
1 + rd02
+
Bf02
1 + rf02
= e+ f0; (2)
f0  f; f1  f; (3)
Bd02
1 + rd02
+
Bf02
1 + rf02
 (e+ f0); (4)
x+ f0  (1  )RsA+ f1 + (1 )Rll + Ic
 
Bd02
1 + rd12
+
Bf02
1 + rf12
!
; (5)
(1  )y +Rf1 = (1  )Rh(K   l) + (1  Ic)

Bd02 +B
f
02

; (6)
where Bd02 and B
f
02 are the face value of domestic and foreign governments bonds, re-
spectively,13 and rd02 and r
f
02 are the long-term discount rates on these bonds. Further-
more, f0 and f1 are net foreign borrowing in stages 0 and 1, respectively, l is the amount
of long-term projects restructured in stage 1; and Ic is a dummy variable which is equal
to 1 when a run occurs and to 0 otherwise (as government bond holdings are intended
to provide extra liquidity in the case of bank run). The discount rates applied on these
bonds, when they are sold in the secondary market in the intermediary stage, are rd12
and rf12, respectively.
Condition (2) is the resource constraint at t = 0. Condition (3) captures the external
credit constraints. Condition (4) is the liquidity regulation constraint. Conditions (5)
and (6) are the banks feasibility/solvability constraints for stages 1 and 2, respectively.
As mentioned above, in stage 1, the bank has the option to restructure a chosen amount
l of long-term projects, with l  K, but the return on these restructured projects is low:
Rl < 1: In stage 2, maturing long-term projects must be enough to match the withdrawal
requests of patient agents and to honor the repayment of debt to foreign investors.
3.2 The optimal allocation (normal times)
We can now describe the optimal allocation of this economy in which banks, viewed
as a coalition of domestic depositors, act in those depositorsinterest. This allocation,
which is obtained as the good Nash equilibrium of the demand deposit system described
above, corresponds to a situation in which investors believe correctly at equilibrium
that the solvency of governments is ensured at any stage, so that the discount rate
13Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists only one "foreign country", and thus only
one kind of "foreign" government bonds.
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applied on long-term government bonds is equal to the risk-free international interest
rate: rd02 = r
f
02 = r
: We refer to this situation as "normal times". Also, note that this
allocation is optimal conditional on the size of the government, as measured by  ; and on
the intensity of liquidity regulation, ; which are taken as given by individual agents.14
The optimal allocation is obtained when banks maximize the expected utility of
depositors:
U(x) + (1  )U(y); (7)
subject to (2)(6): It is easy to verify that all inequality constraints bind at the optimum:
as long as long-term projects are more protable than short-term projects and yield a
higher return than the riskless interest rate in international markets, R < (1  )Rs <
(1  )Rh, it is optimal for banks to borrow as much as they can at the planning stage
so as to invest as many resources as possible in long-term projects. This debt is then
rolled-over at t = 1. Likewise, since the return on government bonds is dominated by the
return on investment projects, banks have interest to hold as little government bonds as
possible, given the liquidity regulation constraint (4). Thus the resource constraint (2),
the credit ceilings (3), the liquidity regulation constraint (4) and the feasibility condition
(5) all bind at the optimum. Moreover, restructuring long-term projects prematurely is
clearly suboptimal ex-ante, so that el = 0.15 We thus obtain:
eA() + eK() + eB()
R
= e+ f (8)ef0 = ef1 = f (9)eB()
R
= (e+ f) (10)
ex() = (1  )Rs eA() (11)
(1  )ey() = (1  )Rh eK() + eB() Rf (12)
where eB()  eBd02 + eBf02 is a basket composed of domestic and foreign government
bonds. Obviously, if these bonds have identical (ex ante) risk and return characteristics,
the composition of the bond portfolio should be indi¤erent to the bank. We simply as-
sume here that domestic banks choose to allocate a fraction  2 (0; 1) of their total bond
purchases to the purchase of domestic government bonds, so that eBd02 =  eB() andeBf02 = (1 ) eB(); and we will consider some implications of this portfolio composition
14The level of the tax rate  ; set to maintain the level of public debt constant in normal times, is
endogenously determined below.
15Tildes are used to characterize the social optimum.
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later when we analyze the issue of contagion.16
From these optimality conditions, we can deduce that the optimal allocation between
x and y must satisfy the social transformation curve:
Rh
Rs
ex() + (1  )ey() = v0    (e+ f) ((1  )Rh  R)  v(): (13)
with v0  (1  )Rh (e+ f) Rf: Given the CRRA utility function, the maximization
of (7) subject to (13) implies that the following rst-order condition
eyex =

Rh
Rs
 1

(14)
must hold. The truth-telling condition Rex < ey then requires:
R <

Rh
Rs
 1

(15)
Using (8)(14), we then obtain the banksoptimal investment strategy giving the best
distribution of resources between patient and impatient depositors as:
eA () = 
(1  )Rh v () ; (16)eK () = (1  ) (e+ f)  
(1  )Rh v () ; (17)ex () = 

Rs
Rh
v () ; (18)
ey () = 1  
1  v () ; (19)
where  
h
1 + (1  )= (Rh=Rs)(1 )=
i 1
is a coe¢ cient in the unit interval.
Note that feasibility requires eK ()  0; which e¤ectively sets an upper bound  on
the intensity of liquidity regulation. In the technical appendix accompanying this paper,
we show that  satises:
 =
(1  )(1  )Rh(e+ f) + Rf
(1  )(1  )Rh(e+ f) + R(e+ f) 2 (0; 1) (20)
16 In practice, there exists subtle di¤erences (such as a distortive domestic legislations) which imply that
domestic and foreign bonds with equivalent risk and return characteristics are not perfectly substitutable
from the viewpoint of domestic banks. The choice of  would then be obtained as the result of an explicit
portfolio optimization problem, given these constraints. We do not explicitly consider this issue here
and simply take  as given.
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Total output eY () in normal times (which we also refer to as "potential output") is
given by eY () = Rs eA () +Rh eK () ;
and the amount of taxes collected by the government is:
eT () =  Rs eA () +Rh eK ()
=  eY () :
We can now describe a "quasi steady-state" for this economy, obtained when "nor-
mal times" periods follow one another. In normal times, the initial debt-to-GDP ratio
inherited from the past period is sustainable: g0  gf : At the beginning of the plan-
ning stage, the government rolls over its public debt D0 by issuing a quantity B02 of
long-term government bonds at current market conditions: rd02 = r
f
02 = r
: In stages 1
and 2, short-term and long-term investment projects mature, the government collectseT () =  eY () of taxes on these projects, and the amount of outstanding debt left at
the end of stage 2 is D2 = D0R+G   eY () : In this "quasi steady-state", the tax rate
 is set so that the level of taxes collected in normal times is just su¢ cient to maintain
the level of public debt constant, i.e. such that D2 = D0 = eD: This occurs when taxes
collected on matured projects are just su¢ cient to nance government expenditures and
to pay interest charges on public debt, i.e. when eT () = G + r eD: The corresponding
tax rate  is thus:  =

G+ r eD =eY () :
Under these conditions, the debt-to-GDP ratio also remains constant and equal to
g2 = g0 = eD=eY ()  eg  gf , so that the next period starts in exactly the same
environment as the current period. Consequently, as expected by domestic depositors
and foreign investors, there is no concern about government solvency.
4 The nancial safety net: regulatory measures and gov-
ernment deposit guarantee
Although the demand deposit contract can decentralize the optimum, it is well-known
from the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analysis that under plausible parameter cong-
urations, the maturity mismatch between the short-term liabilities of banks (deposits)
and their long-term assets (illiquid investment projects) implies that there also exists a
bank run equilibrium triggered by a sudden lack of condence of market operators in
the banking system. This bad equilibrium occurs when all depositors run and attempt
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to withdraw their funds in stage 1 expecting other depositors to do the same and the
bank fails to honor its obligations (and thus bankrupts). We illustrate this possibility
within our model in section 3.1. To overcome this problem, many countries around the
world have implemented a nancial safety net built on two main pillars: bank regulation
and government deposit guarantee. We then analyze the e¤ectiveness of these two pillars
in preventing a large scale banking crisis when there is no concern about the government
solvency. The next section will illustrate why the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis
critically changes the analysis.
4.1 The unregulated economy ( = 0)
Before turning to the nancial safety net, it is useful to consider as a starting point the
benchmark economy without liquidity regulation:  = 0: The economy is in this case
very similar to the small open economy considered in Chang and Velasco (2001), and
most of the results they obtain also apply here. As Chang and Velasco (2001) emphasize,
the conditions of existence of a bank run equilibrium are quite sensitive to the assumption
made about the behavior of foreign investors when a banking crisis threatens. If foreign
investors agree to roll over banksexternal debt in stage 1 at normal market conditions
 for example because banks can credibly commit to repay their liabilities fR under
any circumstances  the liquidity shortage is less severe. We will refer to this case as
a "no sudden stop situation". If, by contrast, foreign investors abruptly decide not to
roll over external debt in stage 1 when they fear that a banking crisis may materialize
(so that f1 = 0); the liquidity shortage becomes much more stringent, and we will
speak in this case of a "sudden stop situation". As Lane (2012) and Shambaugh (2012)
underline, domestic banks in europeriphery countries su¤ered from a major and long-
lasting drying up of external funding shortly after the burst of the nancial crisis. This
contrasts with banks of core-Euro countries which did not face persistent renancing
di¢ culties. Considering these two polar cases is thus important for accounting for the
potentially di¤erent implications of the nancial crisis on the vulnerability of the banking
sector in the core and in the periphery of the Eurozone.
No sudden stop situation. In the "no sudden stop situation", the commitment to
repay external debt fR at stage 2 implies that the maximum amount of long-term pro-
jects that can be liquidated in stage 1 is l+0 = eK0 Rf=((1 )Rh).17 A run equilibrium
then exists as soon as the banks short-term obligations exceed its available resources
17Variables with "0" subscript are used to refer to the unregulated case obtained when  = 0; i.e. for
any variable X; X0  X(0):
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after liquidation, i:e: when ex0   (1  )Rs eA0 +Rll+0  > 0: In the accompanying tech-
nical appendix, we show that this condition can be rewritten as
z+1 
 
r+1  Rl
 (1  )v0
Rh
> 0; (21)
where z+1 is a measure of banks illiquidity in the unregulated economy, and
r+1  (Rh)
 1
 (Rs)
1
 : A trivial equivalent condition is
Rl < r
+
1  (Rh)
 1
 (Rs)
1
 ; (22)
i.e., a run exists as soon as the re sale price of immature investment projects is lower
than the threshold r+1 :
Sudden stop situation. In the "sudden stop situation", there is no rollover of external
debt (i.e. f1 = 0) in stage 1, so that all long-term projects are subject to restructuring:
It can easily be veried that the condition of existence of a run equilibrium, ex0 + f  
(1  )

Rs eA0 +Rl eK0 > 0; is equivalent to
z+2  z+1 +

1  RlR

Rh

f| {z }
>0
> 0 (23)
with z+2 > z
+
1 (by (1)):We can again express this condition in terms of a critical threshold
for the re-sale value of liquidated assets:
Rl < r
+
2 
r+1 +
Rhf
(1 )v0
1 + R
f
(1 )v0
(24)
with r+2 > r
+
1 ; given (15).
Conditions (22) and (24) help to understand why countries in the Europeriphery, like
Ireland or Spain, have been the most exposed to a banking crisis. Like most international
banks, banks in the Eurozone found themselves sharply exposed to the subprime crisis as
they held substantial amounts of Mortgage Backed Securities and related dubious assets
in their balance sheet. During the nancial crisis, the strong depreciation in the value
of these assets, as captured by a decline in Rl; contributed to put those banks under
signicant stress. Yet, in countries like Ireland or Spain, these balance sheet losses were
signicantly aggravated by the collapse of their own domestic real estate market (since
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mortgage loans were granted in large proportion by domestic banks). Moreover, while
banks in core-Euro countries were quickly able to go back to nancial markets and raise
funds, countries in the Europeriphery faced a major and persistent drying up of external
funding (putting them in the "sudden stop situation" described above). Overall, banks
in these countries experienced a much more signicant decrease in the re-sale value Rl of
their assets compared to banks in the core, while the "sudden stop" of external funding
increased disproportionately more their exposure to a liquidity shortage (r+2 > r
+
1 ).
Both factors contributed to weaken their banking system more than in the core of the
Eurozone. Note nally that the threshold r+2 is increasing in f; so that among countries
that experience a drying up of external funding, the model predicts that those with
the larger reliance on foreign investment should be the most exposed to the threat of a
collapse of their banking system.
4.2 Liquidity regulation :  > 0
The unregulated economy considered so far helps to uncover the important forces under-
mining the stability of the banking system, but it does not fully describe the situation of
EZ countries at the onset of the crisis, since most governments had implemented a n-
ancial safety net precisely aimed at preventing the occurrence of large scale bank runs.
We now use our model to describe how the two main pillars of these nancial safety
nets bank regulation and government deposit guarantee can achieve this objective
in normal circumstances.
Consider rst the e¤ects of a liquidity regulation that forces banks to hold a fraction
 > 0 of their assets in the form of AAA-rated government bonds. A straightforward
consequence, underlined by v
0
() < 0, is that such regulation reduces agentsconsump-
tion in normal times (as well as investment in short-term and long-term projects), as it
implies a suboptimal allocation of resources. The benet is that banks, facing the threat
of a bank run, now have the option to sell their government bonds in the secondary
market at the intermediary stage and get extra liquidity to cover the liquidity requests
of depositors. In the absence of concern about domestic or foreign government solvency,
the discount rates applied on these bonds are equal to the risk-free rate, rf12 = r
d
12 = r
;
so that the extra liquidity that can be obtained from these sales is eB()=R:
No sudden stop situation. We can now describe how the liquidity regulation works
in practice. Consider rst the "no sudden stop situation". In this conguration, the
maximum amount of long-term project that can be liquidated in stage 1 is l+1 () =
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eK1()   Rf=((1   )Rh), and the condition for existence of a bank run equilibrium,ex()  (1  )Rs eA() +Rll+1 ()  eB()=R > 0; becomes
z+1 (;R
) = z+1  
 
r+1  Rl
 (1  ) (v0   v())
Rh| {z }
>0
   (e+ f)

1  RlR

Rh

| {z } >
>0
0; (25)
so that z+1 (;R
) < z+1 for any  > 0: We can again express this condition in terms of
a critical threshold for the liquidation value of restructured projects:
Rl < r
+
1 (;R
)  r
+  1()Rh
1 1()R ;  2 (0; e);
with 1()  (e+ f)= ((1  )v()) :
Sudden stop situation. In the "sudden stop situation", we similarly obtain that the
new condition for existence of a bank run equilibrium, ex0+f (1 )Rs eA() +Rl eK() eB()=R > 0; can be expressed as
z+2 (;R
) = z+2  
 
r+1  Rl
 (1  ) (v0   v())
Rh| {z }
>0
   (e+ f)

1  RlR

Rh

| {z }
>0
> 0; (26)
implying z+2 (;R
) < z+2 for any  > 0: Expressed in terms of the liquidation value Rl
of restructured projects, the conditions is:
Rl < r
+
2 (;R
)  r
+  2()Rh
1 2()R ;  2 (0; e);
with 2()  ((e+ f)  f) =(1  )v():
Denoting by i 2 (1; 2) the "no sudden stop" and the "sudden stop" situations, re-
spectively, we show in the technical appendix that, in both cases:
sign

@r+i (;R
)
@

= sign
 
R  

Rh
Rs
 1

!
< 0 (27)
where negativity is implied by (15). Thus, an increase in the intensity of regulation
 reduces the range of values for Rl below which a run equilibrium exists (and thus
decreases the likelihood of existence of a run equilibrium). We also show that there exists
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an ei in (0; ) such that z+i (ei; R) = 0. Thus, any intensity of regulation  2 (ei; )
completely destroys the run equilibrium.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. E¤ectiveness of liquidity regulation
In the absence of sovereign debt concerns, a liquidity regulation imposing banks to
hold a fraction  of their assets in the form of AAA-rated government bonds:
 decreases production and welfare in normal times,
 reduces the likelihood of existence of a run equilibrium,
 destroys the run equilibrium for any  2 (ei; ); where ei solves z+i (ei; R) = 0:
From Proposition 1, it is clearly never optimal to set a regulation intensity greater
than  = ei since liquidity regulation also has a cost in terms of production and welfare.
But even setting  = ei is not necessarily optimal since the benets from eliminating
infrequent bank runs through a large  may be more than o¤set by the welfare losses
incurred in normal times from reduced consumption. For this reason, an alternative
(and arguably better) strategy, typically pursued in industrialized countries, has been to
combine a moderate intensity of liquidity regulation,  < ei; with a government deposit
guarantee. We turn to this issue in the next subsection.
4.3 Government deposit guarantee
We now explore the e¤ect of adding a government deposit guarantee in our benchmark
economy, seen as a commitment by the government to raise any possible additional re-
sources in nancial markets in order to bail out banks with insu¢ cient liquidity (and
thus to cover the liquidity requests of depositors).18 To conform with the initial institu-
tional design of the Eurozone, we assume that the central bank is not allowed either to
participate to this bailout plan through some form of monetization (thus providing the
government with additional seigniorage revenue) or to contribute itself to the deposit
guarantee by playing the role of lender of last resort. Likewise, we also assume that there
does not exist any form of "banking union" which would lead to collectively handle, at
18 In practice, the government guarantee is often limited to a certain amount (e100,000 in most EZ
countries) and to certain types of depositors (households and some SMEs). We abstract from these
specicities as they would not change the substance of our analysis.
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the supranational level, the problems raised by the potential collapse of the banking sys-
tem in one member state. Thus, the government must carry itself the burden of bailing
out failing banks if the run actually occurs. In order to do so, it issues a quantity Bi;12 of
additional (short-term) government bonds, i 2 (1; 2), sold at a discount of the par value.
The discount rate applied on these bonds, rd12 ; depends on the current (intermediary
stage) market conditions. In particular, it depends on investorsexpectations about the
creditworthiness of the government if the bailout package was implemented.
The deposit guarantee provided by the government can now be described as follows:
if the government is expected to be able to borrow, at current market conditions, the
required funds necessary to ll the liquidity gap of banks, then the government deposit
guarantee is said to be credible. In the opposite case, the deposit guarantee is non-
credible. Formally:
Denition 1. Credible deposit guarantee
Let gi(;Rd12); be the level of government debt-per-GDP if a bailout package is im-
plemented at current market conditions, i.e. when the discount rate on newly-issued
government bonds is rd12 = R
d
12  1; where i 2 (1; 2) stands for the "no sudden stop" and
the "sudden stop" situations, respectively. The deposit guarantee is credible if the govern-
ment remains solvent after the implementation of the bailout package: gi(;Rd12)  gf :
Clearly, the di¤erence between a credible and a non-credible deposit guarantee, given
an intensity of regulation ; is that only the former is able to prevent the occurrence of
a bank run. Indeed, under a non-credible government guarantee, depositors anticipate
that the government will not be able to raise su¢ cient resources on nancial markets
to honor the totality of withdrawal requests of depositors, so that each of them has an
interest to run and to attempt to withdraw before the bank bankrupts.
We can now characterize the conditions under which a credible government deposit
guarantee exists in "normal times", i.e., when investors remain condent correctly at
equilibrium  that the government solvency is not endangered by its commitment to
rescue banks.19
To do so, observe rst that if a large scale bank run materializes, the minimal amount
of government liquidity injection required to refund depositors is Gi(;R) = z+i (;R
);
i 2 (1; 2): Raising these funds requires to issue new bonds Bi;12() sold at the price
1=R (if investors do not fear government insolvency, the discount rate on these newly-
issued government bonds is rd12 = r
); so that the required additional amount of public
19We defer the analysis of a global condence crisis to the next section.
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spending is:
Gi(;R
) =
Bi;12()
R
= z+i (;R
):
The amount T+i () of taxes collected by the government is also smaller, as the return
on liquidated projects is smaller than the return on matured projects. In the no "sudden
stop situation" (i = 1); we easily derive
T+1 () = (Rs
eA() +Rll+1 () +Rh( eK()  l+1 ()))
= eT ()  (Rh  Rl)l+1 ()| {z }
>0
; (28)
implying T+1 () < eT (); where eT () is the amount of taxes collected in normal times.
In the "sudden stop" situation (i = 2); all long-run projects are restructured in the
event of a run, and we get
T+2 () = (Rs
eA() +Rl eK())
= eT ()  (Rh  Rl) eK()| {z }
>0
; (29)
implying T+2 () < T
+
1 () <
eT ():
Thus, the level of debt at the end of period 2 after the implementation of the bailout
package is
Di(;R
) = D0R +G+Bi;12(;R)  T+i ()
= eD + z+i (;R)R + ( eT ()  T+i ()):
Dividing the LHS and theRHS by eY (); and dening by ez+i (;R) = z+i (;R)=eY ()
and Ti()  ( eT () T+i ())=eY () the illiquidity index and the tax-revenue losses per
unit of potential GDP, we obtain
gi(;R
) = eg + ez+i (;R)R +Ti(); i 2 (1; 2)
with g2(;R) > g1(;R) > eg:
Clearly, if gi(;R) > gf , depositors understand that the limited ability of the gov-
ernment to raise funds at the prevailing interest rate r is insu¢ cient to fully honor the
withdrawal requests of depositors, so that the guarantee is non-credible. If a large scale
bank run materializes, the reimbursement of depositors is implemented until the public
22
debt ratio increases to the ceiling gf above which the government is considered insolvent.
If, on the contrary, gi(;R)  gf , the government solvency would not be endangered
even if the bailout was implemented. But in this case patient households no longer have
any interest to withdraw their funds in the intermediary stage, and the run equilibrium
is destroyed. Since, at equilibrium, no bailout is implemented, the debt-to-GDP ratio
remains constant and equal to eg. This justies in turn that the market interest rate on
government bonds remains equal to rd12 = r
:
We can summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Existence of a credible deposit guarantee
Let i 2 (1; 2) stands for the "no sudden stop" situation" and the "sudden stop"
situations, respectively. Dene by
gi(;R
) = eg + ez+i (;R)R +Ti() ; i = 1; 2
the debt-to-GDP ratio obtained if a bailout package is implemented at normal market
conditions (i.e., when the discount rate on government bonds is equal to the international
interest rate r). The illiquidity indices ez+i (;R) and the tax revenue losses per unit of
GDP, Ti(); are dened as above. We have:
 2(a) : gi(;R)  gf : the government guarantee is credible and su¢ cient to prevent
the occurrence of a run,
 2(b) : gi(;R) > gf : the government guarantee is non-credible and does not
eliminate the run equilibrium.
Proposition 2 underlines the important role of economic fundamentals for the exist-
ence of an e¤ective nancial safety net. The existence of a credible government guarantee
requires:
 a su¢ ciently low initial debt-to-GDP ratio eg;
 su¢ ciently capitalized domestic banks (i.e., banks with a su¢ ciently low illi-
quidity index ez+i (;R); inuenced by the intensity of regulation );
 low tax revenue losses in the event of a crisis (in particular, a not too low
liquidation value Rl of restructured assets).
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Moreover, a clear corollary from Proposition 2 is that liquidity regulation and gov-
ernment deposit guarantee are complementary instruments in the prevention of banking
crises (since @gi(;R)=@ < 0). Countries with a higher intensity of regulation  have
a lower illiquidity index z+i (;R
) and thus require less government backing to prevent
a bank run. Conversely, "healthy" countries with an initially low level of public debt,
or for which the liquidation value Rl of restructured assets is relatively high, are able to
provide a credible deposit guarantee without imposing a high intensity of regulation.
5 The nancial safety net in a sovereign debt crisis
The analysis undertaken so far has shown that for countries with strong or "decent"
economic fundamentals, the existence of a nancial safety net should be able to deter
the occurrence of a large scale bank run provided that government bonds are truly
considered as "safe assets", i.e. are immune from a sharp revaluation in their risk
component by foreign investors. Yet, the recent EZ crisis has shown that in a monetary
union where the central bank is not allowed to provide substantial backing to distressed
member states, this "safe asset" assumption is not a relevant one. As reected in the
surge in sovereign CDS spreads between core and peripheral EZ countries between 2009
and 2012, documented in numerous studies, investorsexpectations about a countrys
solvency may abruptly change in the face of an ongoing nancial crisis.
In this section, we take account of this fact and assume that investors now truly
question the creditworthiness of a government once the latter is confronted to its com-
mitment to rescue failing domestic banks. We consistently assume that as investors have
more and more doubts about the government solvency, the risk premium they require on
newly-issued sovereign bonds also continuously increases until the public debt-to-GDP
ratio reaches its ceiling gf . How does such feature inuence our analysis above?
5.1 Role of investorsexpectations
To capture the sensitivity of risk premia to changes in investorsexpectations, we follow
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and assume that the yields on government bonds in-
cludes a risk premium which is increasing in the expected debt-to-GDP ratio at the end
of period 2; denoted by ga2 :
Rd12(g
a
2) = R
 + (ga2); (30)
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with (eg) = 0 and 0(ga2) > 0 for ga2 > eg: This notion of a "debt-elastic interest rate" has
become increasingly popular in the literature for its empirical relevance.20
Clearly, the shape of the function () in particular its degree of convexity is likely
to be strongly dependent on the institutional design that characterizes the monetary
union. In particular, for reasons emphasized above, the sensitivity of the risk premium
to a change in the level of public debt is likely to be less acute in standalone countries
with monetary sovereignty or in a monetary union where the central bank plays the role
of lender of last resort in sovereign debt markets than in a monetary union in which the
statutes of the central bank prevents it from doing so.
5.2 Twin banking and sovereign debt crisis
We now introduce our main di¤ering assumption compared to the previous section by
assuming that investors now believe that the solvency of the government would be truly
endangered if the banking crisis threat were to materialize. This means that they believe
that if the government was forced to borrow additional funds in order to bail out banks
and to implement the deposit guarantee, the level of public debt would quickly reach
the ceiling gf above which the government is prevented from making further borrowing.
As a result of (30), the yields on newly-issued government bonds jumps to Rd12(gf ) =
R+ (gf )  Rgf12 : Can such a negative shift in investors"sentiment" be justied under
the assumption of rational expectations?
To answer this question, observe that the impact of an increase in the risk premium
on government bonds has two negative e¤ects on the solidity of the banking system
and on public nance. First, it decreases the market price of government bonds in
the secondary market (from 1=R to 1=Rgf12), which in turn reduces the liquidity bu¤ereB()=Rgf12 that banks can obtain from selling their government bond holdings (and
thus aggravates their solvency situation).21 This is synthesized by the illiquidity index
20See, among others, Uribe (2007), Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), Justiniano and Preston (2010) and
Fahri et al. (2011) for recent references. The main di¤erence with these previous papers is that, in
(30), we are assuming that the interest rate is sensitive to the expected, instead of the current, debt-to-
GDP ratio. This assumption, which we see as more realistic (what matters for investors is whether the
government will be solvent at the maturity date of the bonds, and not at their issue date), also leaves
the room for investorsexpectations to signicantly a¤ect the dynamics of the economy, as we establish
in propositions 3 to 5 below.
21For simplicity of exposition, we assume in this section that the portfolio of domestic banks is only
composed of government bonds issued by their own government, i.e.  = 1: We relax this assumption
below when we analyze the issue of contagion.
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obtained when Rd12(g
a
2) = R
gf
12 , which jumps to
z+i (;R
gf
12) = z
+
i (;R
) +  (e+ f)

1  R

R
gf
12

| {z }
>0
; i = 1; 2;
implying z+i (;R
gf
12) > z
+
i (;R
):
Second, the increase in the risk premium on government bonds burdens the cost of the
bailout package for the government, which must now issue new bonds at signicantly
deteriorated nancial conditions. Using the same reasoning as above, we can easily
compute the level of public debt if the bailout package was implemented as
gi
 
;R
gf
12
  eg + z+i  ;Rgf12Rgf12 +Ti() ; i = 1; 2; (31)
implying gi
 
;R
gf
12

> gi (;R
) : Note that the level of public debt is actually negat-
ively a¤ected twice, since a larger nancial backstop, z+i
 
;R
gf
12

> z+i (;R
); must be
nanced by issuing new government bonds at a higher borrowing cost, R
gf
12 > R
:
Clearly, if gi
 
;R
gf
12

> gf ; the high interest rate R
gf
12 required on government bonds
is consistent with rational expectations, since at the prevailing borrowing rate the gov-
ernment is unable to obtain su¢ cient liquidity on nancial markets to fully compensate
depositors: the deposit guarantee is in this case non-credible. The governments oblig-
ations imply that the compensation of depositors will be made until the public debt
ratio reaches the ceiling gf : Yet, depositors understand that they will not all be able to
obtain the government compensation and run to withdraw their funds: a twin banking
and sovereign debt crisis materializes. Summarizing:
Proposition 3. Existence of a twin crisis equilibrium
Dene by
gi
 
;R
gf
12
  eg + ez+i  ;Rgf12Rgf12 +Ti() ; i = 1; 2
the debt-to-GDP ratio obtained if a large-scale bailout package is implemented under
stressed nancial market conditions (the current discount factor on government bonds
is equal to R
gf
12 = R
 + (gf )): The illiquidity indices ez+i  ;Rgf12 and the tax revenue
losses per unit of GDP, Ti() (i = 1; 2); are dened as above. We have:
 3(a) : gi
 
;R
gf
12

> gf : a twin crisis equilibrium exists despite the government
deposit guarantee,
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 3(b) : gi
 
;R
gf
12
  gf : no twin crisis equilibrium exists.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we immediately obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4. Multiplicity of equilibria
If gi (;R) < gf < gi
 
;R
gf
12

, the government deposit guarantee is credible in
"normal times", and non-credible under stressed nancial market conditions. The ex-
istence of a nancial safety net either completely eliminates the bank run equilibrium or
triggers a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis.
Although controversial, we believe that Corollary 4 may very well have characterized
the situation of europeriphery countries at the onset of the nancial crisis. As emphasized
above, countries like Ireland, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal, had a very low
initial debt-to-GDP ratio. In these countries, while the burst of the housing bubble
signicantly reduced the value of immature assets Rl  putting their banking sector
under stress the decision to bail out failing banks and to increase the amounts covered
by the deposit guarantees did not prove useful to stabilize the crisis. On the contrary,
growing suspicions by foreign investors as to whether such countries would be able to
honor their debt in the future generated sharp increases in the risk premium on their
sovereign bonds, at levels never observed before. But such high levels of borrowing rates
indeed implied that these countries were virtually excluded from nancial markets, thus
making their debt e¤ectively unsustainable and triggering a twin banking and sovereign
debt crisis.
What Corollary 4 shows, in any case, is that the possibility of multiple equilibria
a¤ects countries with "soft" (neither overly weak or strong) economic fundamentals:
countries for which gi (;R) > gf will collapse independently of whether there exists
a government deposit guarantee or not, and countries for which gi
 
;R
gf
12

< gf are
immune to a twin-crisis equilibrium under any circumstances.
5.3 Potentially perverse e¤ects of regulation
The inability of a monetary union to prevent the occurrence of a twin banking and
sovereign debt crisis a¤ecting a subset of its member states obviously raises questions
about its whole institutional architecture. Actually, using our model, a simple question
can be raised as to whether the liquidity regulation really improved, or actually worsened,
the nancial situation of banks during the crisis. To understand why this is an issue,
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observe that once a sovereign debt crisis materializes and banks are forced to sell their
government bonds in the secondary market, the ex-post return on these bonds is strongly
negative (bonds were purchased at unit price 1=R while they are sold at the price
1=R
gf
12 < 1=R
). When the increase in the risk premium (Rgf12) is very large, the
opportunity cost of selling government bonds in such poor market conditions may turn
out to be greater than the opportunity cost of restructuring immature long-term projects.
In this case, the regulatory requirements imposed ex ante actually worsens the liquidity
situation of banks ex post.
To establish this point formally, we rewrite as Rl < r
+
1 (;R
gf
12) the condition
z+i (;R
gf
12) > 0 required for the existence of a run equilibrium in the no-sudden stop
situation when the discount rate on government bonds jumps to R
gf
12 in the intermediary
stage. In the technical appendix, we show that:
sign

@r+1 (;R
gf
12)
@

= sign
 
Rgf12  

Rh
Rs
 1

!
(32)
with R
gf
12 = R
+(Rgf12). Thus, as soon as the risk premium on domestic sovereign debt,
(R
gf
12); exceeds (Rh=Rs)
1
  R; an increase in the intensity of regulation  worsens the
liquidity situation of banks in stressed nancial market conditions.22
In the "sudden stop" situation, the same logic applies, but the situation can be even
much worse. In the technical appendix, we show that we have is this case
sign

@r+2 (;R
gf
12)
@

= sign
 
R
gf
12  
"
(1  )

Rh
Rs
 1

+ R
#!
; (33)
where
 

1 +
(1  )(1  )Rr+
(1  )(1  )Rh + R
e
f
 1
(34)
22To understand the logic behind (32), consider the e¤ects of the liquidity regulation when a banking
crisis threat materializes without and with a sovereign debt crisis. Without sovereign debt crisis, each
unit of government bonds sold in the secondary market provides 1=R units of extra liquidity in stage
1, instead of 1 unit in stage 2. Likewise, each unit of restructured projects enables to obtain Rl units
of liquidity in stage 1; compared to Rh units in stage 2. The regulatory measure improves the liquidity
situation of banks when the relative return of selling government bonds is greater than the one obtained
from restructuring long-term projects: 1=R > Rl=Rh; or R < Rh=Rl: Since the existence of a run
equilibrium in the uregulated economy requires Rl < r+1  (Rh)
 1
 (Rs)
1
 ; we can equivalently express
this condition as R < (Rh=Rs)1=, a condition which is automatically satised given (15). When a
sovereign debt crisis occurs, the surge in the risk premium on government bonds implies that the market
value of these bonds is now 1=Rgf12 : Using the same reasoning as above but substituting R
gf
12 to R
; we
obtain that the liquidity regulation improves the liquidity situation of banks when Rgf12 < (Rh=Rs)
1=;
and worsens it otherwise.
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is a coe¢ cient in the unit interval, which depends on the countrys reliance on foreign
funding (a larger dependence on foreign investment implies a smaller e=f and a coe¢ cient
 closer to 1). Thus, condition (33) shows that, in a sovereign debt crisis, an increase
in the intensity of regulation  now weakens the liquidity situation of banks as soon as
(R
gf
12) exceeds (1  )

(Rh=Rs)
(1=)  R

. This condition is signicantly weaker than
(32) above, especially when 1    is small, i.e. when the reliance of domestic banks on
foreign funding is large. Summarizing:
Proposition 5. Potentially perverse e¤ects of liquidity regulation
Assume that the risk premium on newly-issued government bonds satises (R
gf
12) >
(Rh=Rs)
(1=) R in the "no sudden stop" situation, and (Rgf12) > (1 )
h
(Rh=Rs)
(1=)  R
i
in the "sudden stop" situation, where  is dened by (34). Then, in a sovereign debt
crisis situation, an increase in the intensity of regulation  aggravates, instead of mit-
igates, the exposition of domestic banks to runs.
Again, the implications of Proposition 5 are worth clarifying. The proposition does
not per se imply that a liquidity regulation is harmful to the economy under any cir-
cumstances. On the contrary, in section 2, we proved that such a regulation, alone or
combined with a government deposit guarantee, is a useful tool to eliminate the bank run
equilibrium in normal circumstances. The proposition rather suggests that a liquidity
regulation may have perverse e¤ects when the assets required to be held by banks for
liquidity purposes do not have the "safe asset" property they were supposed to have.
In the case of the Eurozone, this lack of "safe asset" property is best understood as a
consequence of the inability for the central bank to play the role of lender of last resort
in sovereign debt markets when an abrupt change in investorsexpectations threatens to
drive one or several member states into a self-fullling twin banking and sovereign debt
crisis.23
6 Policy issues
In this last section, we show how our framework can be used to discuss rather informally
several of the policy issues that have emerged during the Eurozone crisis. Our aim here
23As shown by Corsetti and Dedola (2013), the ability by a central banks to issue nominal liabilities
whose demand is not undermined by fears of default can indeed eliminate the risk of a sovereign debt
crisis triggered by self-fullling changes in investors expectations. Likewise, in the canonical Calvo
(1988) model, the central banks ability to put a ceiling on government bond interest rates is su¢ cient
to eliminate a self-fullling sovereign debt crisis.
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is not to address these complex issues in details which would be far beyond the scope
of this paper but rather to shed some insights on their main underpinnings and/or
implications. We rst consider the role played by credit rating agencies in the crisis
and assess the proposition that they have contributed to aggravate the crisis. Then, we
discuss the issue of contagion from stressed to other member states through the banking
system. Finally, we briey address some questions raised by the creation of "Eurobonds".
6.1 Role of credit rating agencies
At the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis, many commentators and political
leaders have expressed concerns that Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have contributed
to aggravate the crisis by downgrading countries by much more than implied by funda-
mentals. According to them, these decisions contributed to spread panic among investors
(aggravating the sudden stop of capital inows) and to induce an unsustainable sovereign
debt burden due to the climb of yield spreads. Thus, voices calling for regulation and
control of CRAs have emerged.
Our model can be used to explore the meaningfulness of these arguments and to
assess their domain of validity. Assume that, because information is costly to acquire,
investors delegate the task of assessing the creditworthiness of the government to a
specialized entity, called a "credit rating agency". The CRA is completely independent
of any political entity and aims to provide the most accurate evaluation of the government
situation at the end of the period. The results of its analysis are reected by a rating
decision on a discrete scale assumed to include only two ratings, Aand B. Denote
by gacra the CRA forecast for the level of the public debt ratio at the end of stage 2. It is
publicly known that the CRA rating will be A if the CRA expects that the government
will be able to honor its debt under any circumstances (i.e., if gacra < gf ); and that its
rating will be B otherwise.
If investors give strong credence to the CRAs forecast, the interest rate rd12 on
newly-issued government bonds will be a direct function of the CRA rating: rd12(A) =
r+(A) = r; and rd12(B) = r+(B) = r
gf
12 :We can then state the following proposition,
obtained as a direct implication of propositions 2 and 3 when investorsexpectations are
inuenced by CRA ratings:
Proposition 6. Self-fullling credit ratings
Assume that Credit Rating Agencies set their rating as described above, and the
discount rate required by investors on newly-issued government debt is based on the CRA
ratings: rd12(A) = r and rd12(B) = r
gf
12 . We have:
30
 6(a): gi
 
;R
gf
12

< gf ; the only consistent (perfect-foresight) rating is A,
 6(b): gi(;R)  gf ; the only consistent (perfect-foresight) rating is B,
 6(c): gi(;R) < gf  gi
 
;R
gf
12

; there are two consistent (perfect-foresight)
ratings: A and B: In addition, the rating decision acts as a self-fullling prophecy.
Proposition 6 gives both support and qualications to the claims that rating down-
grades of europeriphery countries may have acted as a self-fullling prophecy. A rst
obvious qualication is that investorsexpectations must be signicantly inuenced by
the CRA ratings. As is often argued, this is most likely the case for countries for which
the size of capital inows is moderate on a worldwide scale or for which information is
more di¢ cult to collect. A second qualication is that there are situations for which eco-
nomic fundamentals determine a unique consistent rating : countries with a high initial
public debt ratio and/or an extremely fragile banking system (case (b) of Proposition 6)
would collapse whatever their rating, while countries with very robust economic funda-
mentals (case (a) of proposition 6) would not collapse whatever their rating even if they
had to implement a bailout package.
Finally, in case (c) of proposition 6, the decision to downgrade or not a country may
indeed act as a self-fullling prophecy. Note that case (c) corresponds to our "featured"
situation analyzed above, where a good equilibrium in which the nancial safety net
prevents the occurrence of a bank run coexists with a bad equilibrium in which a twin
banking and sovereign debt crisis arises. In this case, a rating downgrade by a CRA
may indeed favor the trigger of the twin crisis by playing the role of an exogenous
selection device, coordinating investorsexpectations on the bad equilibrium. It is worth
noting that in this case, the rating decision by the CRA will appear ex-post as perfectly
justied by economic fundamentals, since the situation that will materialize will actually
be inuenced by the rating decision.
6.2 Contagion
A major concern in the European sovereign debt crisis has been the issue of contagion
from stressed countries to other member states. Peripheral countries such as Greece,
Ireland or Portugal only account for a small share of the total GDP of the Eurozone,
so that this fear of a contagion did not stem from the negative impact on exports and
imports implied by the economic contraction in these countries. Rather, fears arose from
the potential domino e¤ect that a global collapse of one country (public debt default
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and large-scale bankruptcy of the domestic banking system) would have on the banking
system of the others.
In this subsection, we show how our model can be used to take into account this con-
tagion e¤ect via the banking system. In particular, we analyze how a relatively "healthy"
country of the monetary union can be a¤ected by the degradation of the economic situ-
ation in an other member state. Assume for that matter that, for some exogenous reason
(bad economic fundamentals and/or negative self-fullling expectations of investors), the
other country participating to the monetary union (the "foreign" country) is involved
in a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis, so that the risk premium on its sovereign
bonds jumps to R
gf
12 > R
 in the intermediary stage.
This risk premium increase has two negative e¤ects on the economic situation of the
healthy country. First, it decreases the liquidity bu¤er that domestic banks can obtain
by selling their foreign government bonds in the secondary market, thus weakening the
liquidity situation of these banks: this is a direct e¤ect. Second, the stressed economic
environment  in particular the more fragile banking system may lead investors to
reassess their evaluation of the creditworthiness of the domestic government, which is
now more likely to have to intervene in order to rescue domestic banks: this is an indirect
e¤ect. These two negative e¤ects can potentially reinforce each other, an increase in the
risk premium on domestic government bonds would not only further deteriorate the
liquidity situation of (domestic and foreign) banks, but also further increase the cost of
a potential bailout for the government.
More formally, denote as above by Rd12(g
a
2) the discount factor on domestic gov-
ernment bonds in the intermediary stage, as determined by (30). If investors, taking
into account the increased vulnerability of the banking system, remain condent in the
solvency of the domestic government, the discount rate on newly-issued government
bonds remains equal to Rd12 = R
: If, by contrast, investors become concerned about
the government solvency in this new economic situation, the discount rate jumps to
Rd12 = R
gf
12 > R
:
Using our assumption that domestic banks in the healthy country allocated a fraction
1    and  of their total government bond purchases to the purchase of foreign and
domestic sovereign bonds, respectively, their illiquidity index after the risk premium
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increase on foreign sovereign bonds is
z+1

;Rd12(g
a
2); R
gf
12

= ex()  (1  )Rs eA() +Rll+1 ()  eBf02=Rgf12   eBd02=Rd12
= z+1 (;R
) + (1  )(e+ f)

1  R

R
gf
12

| {z }
>0
(direct e¤ect)
+(e+ f)

1  R

Rd12(g
a
2)

| {z };
= 0 if Rd12(g
a
2) = R

> 0 if Rd12(g
a
2) = R
gf
12
(indirect e¤ect)
(35)
with z+1
 
;R
gf
12 ; R
gf
12

> z+1
 
;R; Rgf12

> z+1 (;R
).
As (35) shows, the liquidity bu¤er of domestic banks is immediately reduced after
the increase in the risk premium on foreign sovereign bonds, by an extent which depends
on 1   , the share of foreign in total bond holdings, and on Rgf12=R, the yield spread
between "safe" and "risky" sovereign bonds (this is the direct e¤ect). The indirect
e¤ect, on the other hand, only occurs if investors change their evaluation about the
creditworthiness of the "healthy" government (so that Rd12(g
a
2) = R
gf
12 > R
): In this
case, the liquidity situation of banks is further deteriorated by the decrease in the value
of domestic government bonds that occurs in this new economic environment.
For similar reasons, the indirect e¤ect also increases the cost of a potential bailout
for the government, since a larger amount of funds must be raised in nancial mar-
kets by issuing more government bonds at a higher interest rate, R
gf
12 . Denoting by
gi
 
;Rd12; R
gf
12
  eg + z+1  ;Rd12; Rgf12Rd12 + Ti() the expected debt-to-GDP ratio
if the more expensive government bailout package was implemented (and nanced) at
current market conditions Rd12; we see that as soon as
gi
 
;R; Rgf12

< gf < gi
 
;R
gf
12 ; R
gf
12

;
both types of investorsexpectations (pessimistic or optimistic) are consistent with ra-
tional expectations.
This result emphasizes the potentially devastating domino e¤ects that a twin banking
and sovereign debt crisis a¤ecting one or several member states may have over the entire
monetary union. When, for some exogenous reason, the foreign country is hit by a twin
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banking and sovereign debt crisis, the domestic country may be driven into a similar
crisis mainly because the weakening situation of banks changes investorsexpectations
about the solvency of the government.
In the Eurozone, the climb in sovereign yields in peripheral Euro countries put banks
in countries like France and Germany (which were holding signicant amounts of sov-
ereign debt and of bonds issued by banks in stressed countries) under increasing stress.
Fears of contagion became a predominant concern for the Eurozone and worldwide, lead-
ing the IMF to urge domestic governments to take mandatory actions to force banks to
recapitalize (and even to consider contributing themselves to such recapitalization).24
6.3 Eurobonds
The potential domino e¤ects of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis in a monetary
union has stimulated a number of proposals by economists and policymakers to avoid
the resurgence of such crises. One of the most discussed proposals has been the creation
of Eurobonds, i.e. common sovereign debt securities pooling the risks of all Eurozone
countries.
Proponents of the Eurobond proposal (see e.g. Brunnermeier et al., 2011) argue that
issuing such bonds would be an e¤ective solution to restore the market condence and
to reduce the pressure on renancing of Eurozone member states in crisis. Opponents
to the proposal emphasize that pooling public debts may create a serious moral hazard
problem, since scally imprudent governments would be encouraged to not su¢ ciently
control their budgetary decits, undermining the stability of the whole Monetary Union
while eventually increasing risks and associated costs for all member states in the future.
Without addressing this debate,25 our framework is at least useful to evaluate the
conditions under which "Eurobonds"would be an e¤ective way of ghting against twin
banking and sovereign debt crisis. Assume that, instead of holding a proportion  and
(1  ) of domestic and foreign bonds, respectively, banks now have access to "Euro-
24 In a famous and controversial statement, Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF, declared at the
onset of the European sovereign debt crisis: "[European] banks need urgent recapitalization. They
must be strong enough to withstand the risks of sovereigns and weak growth. This is key to cutting
the chains of contagion. If it is not addressed, we could easily see the further spread of economic
weakness to core countries, or even a debilitating liquidity crisis. The most e¢ cient solution would
be mandatory substantial recapitalization seeking private resources rst, but using public funds if
necessary." [Christine Lagarde: "Global Risks Are Rising, But There Is a Path to Recovery", speech at
the Jackson Hole Conference, August 27, 2011].
25A thorough assessment of the potential costs and benets of Eurobonds within a more general
analysis of various (ex post and ex ante) solidarity schemes is provided by Tirole (2014).
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bonds" issued at the monetary union level. This means that, instead of
A+K +
 
Bd02
1 + rd02
+
Bf02
1 + rf02
!
= e+ f0
constraint (2) would become:
A+K +

Beuro
1 + reuro02

= e+ f0
where Beuro is the face value of Eurobonds held by the bank. In the planning stage,
without crisis threat, the discount rates on domestic, foreign and Euro-bonds are rd02 =
rf02 = r
euro
02 = r
: However, at the intermediary stage, concerns about the solvency of
some member states imply an increase in the risk premium associated to their sovereign
bonds and to newly-issued Eurobonds. Assume for example that the stressed country is
the "foreign country", so that the discount factors on newly-issued government bonds are
1+rd12 = R
 and 1+rf12 = R
gf
12 ; respectively, in the intermediary stage. If domestic banks
had invested in domestic and foreign government bonds (in proportion  and (1   ),
respectively), the liquidity bu¤er obtained by selling these bonds in a stressed situation iseBd02=R+ eBf02=Rgf12 =  (e+ f) =R+(1 ) (e+ f) =Rgf12 : If instead they had invested
in Eurobonds, the liquidity bu¤er would be Beuro=(1 + reuro12 ) =  (e+ f) =(1 + r
euro
12 ):
Denoting by 1 + rH   =R + (1  )=Rgf12 1 the weighted harmonic mean of R
and R
gf
12 (with weights given by the shares of government bond holdings issued by the
domestic and the foreign country in the representative bank portfolio), our analysis
suggests that if, in crisis time, the interest rate on Eurobonds reuro12 would be smaller
than the implicit discount rate rH , the creation of Eurobonds would improve the liquidity
situation of banks in crisis time (and would worsen it otherwise).
Proponents of the Eurobonds proposal argue that this would typically be the case.
Clearly, as they underline, the way these bonds would be structured and guaranteed
is crucial for that matter. For example, would the guarantee be joint or several ? A
joint guarantee would likely make the Eurobond discount rate smaller than the average
discount rate rH on a representative banks government bond holdings in the event of
a crisis. But such bonds are di¢ cult to implement for political reasons. On the other
hand, if Eurobonds were structured as a several guarantee, their ability to decrease reuro12
below rH in the event of a crisis would be far from warranted.
For example, assume as above that investors adjust their expectation according to
CRA ratings. In a widely quoted September 2011 declaration, Standard and Poors
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warned that if Eurobonds were structured such that each member state guarantees only a
xed share of the debt (several guarantee), it would rate these bonds using the "weakest-
link approach", i.e. it would get the weakest members rating.26 Thus, we would have in
this case reuro12 = r
+(B) > rH and the liquidity situation of banks would be aggravated,
and not improved, by the presence of Eurobonds structured in that way.
7 Conclusion
We developed a simple open-economy model with a large banking system and a strong
reliance on external funding to examine the conditions of emergence of a twin banking
and sovereign debt crisis in a monetary union with an institutional architecture broadly
similar to that of the Eurozone when it entered the 2007-2009 nancial crisis. Our
analysis shows that when the central bank is unwilling, in any circumstances, to play
the role of lender of last resort and to back the government debt of stressed member
states, the main instrument to ght against systemic banking crisis  the nancial
safety net may not be able to prevent the occurrence of large scale bank runs. The
banking system and the government may either survive a negative nancial shock or
fail together, depending on investorsexpectations. Under extreme circumstances yet
circumstances that have been observed during the EZ crisis the climb in the risk premia
on stressed sovereign bonds can even imply that the regulatory framework imposed to
banks exacerbate, instead of mitigate, the risk of emergence of a twin banking and
sovereign debt crisis. We also used our framework to assess the potentially destabilizing
role played by credit rating agencies in such crises, to analyze potential contagion e¤ects
through the banking system, and to discuss some policy options that have emerged to
avoid the resurgence of such crises, in particular the creation of Eurobonds.
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